A Virtuous Man: The One Who Acts Justly

The day before the soccer game, I was outside running and practicing my dribbling skills with a soccer ball. Almost instantly, while completing the very first round, a little obese kid approached me, and asked me if he could play. In my mind, my very first thought was to give him the soccer ball for the sole reason that I would feel bad if he feels bad. Yet, another part inside me did not want to play with him because I was not playing and wanted to practice for the soccer game. Also, if I gave him the ball, I would be showing him that it is right to let ourselves to be moved by our desires as long as we can feel the satisfaction of our pleasures. On the other hand, if I gave him the ball, that could be a situation that would make him want to practice sports, and so it would be beneficial for him, and for the sake of sports as well. Even more thoughts went through my mind in that short instance, but the one question that drew my mind was if Aristotle would have responded in the same way. If Aristotle were to tell us that we must do what the virtuous person does, and that the virtuous person acts justly, the assumption that this must be accounted as circular reasoning could be raised. Aristotle, however, does not commit such fallacy because he would probably point out that a virtuous person can be virtue while not acting justly. Similarly, a person can appear to practice just acts without being virtue. Thus, after understanding Aristotle’s reasoning in the mentioned case, we could make the point that his ethical system is sufficiently action-guiding because it presents an outline that can be applied to particular circumstances, it provides a breakdown of the human being in relation to their actions, and it explains the problem of desire, which is a determinative factor in the result of any action.

If Aristotle were to answer that the virtuous man is the one who acts justly, it is important to understand that the first and second premises are not the same. At a first glance, it might appear that the person who acts justly is similar to the virtuous person. This interpretation of Aristotle’s reasoning might be the result of finding a similitude in the words just and virtuous. In other words, we might think that a man  is a virtuous person because he is acts justly. For Aristotle, however, being virtuous and acting justly are two different components of his ethical system. For instance, when he discusses the idea of excellence, he says,

“human excellence will be the disposition that makes one a good man, and causes him to perform his function well” (40).

Without revising all that is meant by human excellence entails, Aristotle introduces us to the idea that a good man is not the same as a man who perform his function well. Thus, this underlines the reasoning that explains why a virtuous man is not similar to a man who acts justly. In that sense, the virtuous man is a good man while the man who acts justly is the virtuous man who performs his function well.

After considering that there is a distinction between the virtuous man and the one who acts justly, we can make the point that a man can be virtuous and not act justly. This is the case for the virtuous man that is moved by desire. After Aristotle explains the different types of pleasure, he argues that a man that is incontinent of desire can be unjust when he is moved by anger:

“[s]o if actions are unjust in proportion to the justification of the anger that they arouse, incontinence of desire is more unjust than incontinence of temper, because there is no insolence in temper” (182).

Essentially, Aristotle suggests that a man might be morally virtuous, and know where the mean lies in a given situation, but still be moved by a factor that differs from the mean and the right principle—desire. Now, a critic of Aristotle’s ethics might object that the fact that a person is moved by desire shows that a person is not virtuous at all. This objection, however, is missing the point that, according to Aristotle, incontinence of desire refers to the disposition in which a man is moved by desire while knowing that he is wrong (172). Thus, contrary to a licentious man—the one who chooses pleasure for its own sake—the man who is incontinent of desire is unjust only when he is compared to the man that is incontinent of tempter in the context of the origin of their feelings. In other words, a man who is incontinent of desire is still virtuous, but the man who is incontinent of temper seems to be even more virtuous.

Similarly to the scenario where a virtuous man does not perform his function well, there is also the possibility in which a person appears to act justly without being a virtuous person. When Aristotle explains that prudence—a practical faculty of the calculative mind—is related to natural virtue, he says that “various kinds of character are in some sense the gifts of  nature…because the natural dispositions are found in children and brutes, but without intelligence” (165). Thus, Aristotle points at the idea that what it seems to be acts of justice could be the natural virtues that lead a man without a rational choice to act justly. However, because prudence is a practical state of the mind, the man who acts justly as a result of his natural virtue, is not called virtue in the full sense as this is attributed to the use of both natural virtue and prudence.

Whereas other ethical systems might appeal to authoritarian sets of rules, Aristotle’s virtue ethics do not apply such parameter; instead, his virtue ethics provide an ethical framework that can be applied to multiple particular situations. This one of the strongest points on Aristotle’s behalf and it sets the basis of a greatest good, which cannot be achieved by authoritarian rules because they are more concern with what Aristotle would call the universals. Although Aristotle would likely address the issue in more depth, one way to look at this other systems from his perspective would be to state that authoritarian rules are more involved with the general problems of morality than the particulars as they do not touch upon all particular circumstances. Since authoritarian rules do not cover all circumstances, they become useless for the particulars, and can only be used as universals for ethical issues—they can only be used in a more general sense.

A skeptic in defense of authoritarian rules would argue that Aristotle’s outline would not address the specifics of any ethical issue as he only provides an empty outline, which would only left us with a blurred thought of the right thing to do in the practice. However, Aristotle would probably respond by saying that “a carpenter’s interest in the right angle is different from a geometrician’s: the former is concerned with it only so far as it is useful for his work, but the other wants to know what it is or what its properties are, because his gaze is set on the truth” (17). Aristotle would, then, compare his work with that of a carpenter, which is the foundation of the truth. On the other hand, the person in pro of sets of rules would be as the geometrician who is limited to observe the truth.

Although Aristotle’s framework might seem unclear—because of the multiple categorizations—his example of the supreme good as a target could bring out more clarity into his ideas. When Aristotle introduces his argument about connection between the activities and their ends, he says, “[We] are more likely to achieve our aim if we have a target” (4). In other words, Aristotle makes point that setting a target as the supreme good would help us to achieve it. Thus, if we were to elaborate on Aristotle’s analogy, and say that we are like archers who aim to the target with arrows and bows. While the bow string represents the right principle—which can never be too relaxed neither too stretched—the center of the target represents the mean, and the circles surrounding it are the vices. In that sense, we as the archers are related to the intellectual virtues while the target is concerned with the moral virtues and everything that helps us identify the mean. As in Aristotle’s virtue ethics, we might sometimes point at the aim and not hit it while other times, we might not try to hit the mea, but hit it without the need of practical intelligence.

Furthermore, Aristotle not only provides an outline that can be applied to particulars, but he also shows us a breakdown of the human faculties, and states in relation to their actions. This is crucial in terms of providing a solution for particular ethical issues. This is because when the solution to an ethical issue focuses on the problem, it might suggests to implement a moral value that matches the problem from the perspective that a problem is bad; and therefore, we must do a good in order to solve it. That is why Aristotle’s explanation of the human faculties are important because they not only helps us to find a good to solve a bad, but understanding where the good comes from will help us to perform the good in the right way. Also, Aristotle would also claim that in order to be a person acts justly—a person who does good in the right way—we must make use of all human capabilities: “he​ ​full​ ​performance​ ​of​ ​man’s​ ​function​ ​depends​ ​upon​ ​a​ ​combination​ ​of​ ​prudence​ ​and​ ​moral virtue;​ ​virtue​ ​ensures​ ​the​ ​correctness​ ​of​ ​the​ ​end​ ​at​ ​which​ ​we​ ​aim,​ ​and​ ​prudence​ ​that​ ​of​ ​the means​ ​towards​ ​it”​ ​(163).​ In other words, the agent who seeks to be virtuous in any given situation must be able to use the best part of his moral and intellectual virtues simultaneously.

Lastly, Aristotle’s breakdown of the pleasures allows us to understand the right disposition towards the problem of desire. We could recall personal experiences, and might agree that in many situations, we do not listen to advice because of a strong desire forced us to do what was wrong. Thus, regardless of any advice we could receive, we would end up following our desire, and therefore, all of the good things Aristotle would show us about the humankind and the supreme good are of little value towards our desirable ends. This is discussed in Aristotle’s argument on incontinence when he explains that a prudent man can be incontinent as well: “Although​ ​incontinence​ ​and​ ​licentiousness​ ​are​ ​concerned​ ​with​ ​the​ ​same​ ​pleasures​ ​(the necessary​ ​pleasures),​ ​​they​ ​are​ ​not​ ​concerned​ ​with​ ​them​ ​in​ ​the​ ​same​ ​way​;​ ​the​ ​licentious​ ​act from​ ​choice,​ ​and​ ​the​ ​incontinent​ ​do​ ​not”​ ​(177).​ Essentially, this comparison is meant to show that the incontinent man is moved by desire to enjoy pleasure even though he knows what is right. Although it might seem like there is an absolute solution to the problem of desire, Aristotle gives us a hint to what the right disposition towards desire should be: “the opposite of the incontinent type is the continent, and of the soft type the enduring; for endurance consists in resisting one’s desires, but continence in conquering them—two quiet different things, just as avoiding defeat is different from winning” (184). Thus, Aristotle seems to suggests that the incontinent person is the one trying to resists pleasure, which would be the incorrect approach as pleasures are to be dominated. After an examination of the mentioned disposition, we are provided with an idea that answers personal experiences that seem contrary to Aristotle’s ethics.

In Aristotle’s ethical system, a man who acts justly is the man who is virtues and performs his function to the right extent. In this system, Aristotle provides the basis of what he would call the truth, which serves to aim at the mean through the right means. His categorizations such as the states of the mind help us recognize the best states of the human being, which need to all be used through action simultaneously, and even if our personal experience with desire seems to turn down his entire ethical system, Aristotle would tell us to stop resisting our desire in order to conquer it. Thus, when a child approaches us to play with us when we are doing something important, we can recall Aristotle’s action-guiding to contemplate the situation and do the correct thing, towards the correct child, in the right moment through the right means.

Works Cited

The Nicomachean Ethics. New York, Penguin Books, 1955, pp. 3-190.